



verifiche

«VERIFICHE» ISSN 0391-4186

- M. Giusti *Filosofia del diritto senza Scienza della logica? Un dibattito in corso sulla filosofia sociale di Hegel*
- A. Nuzzo *Hegel's Idea of Philosophy and the World at the End*
- M.A. Werle *Motivos da estética de Kant na estética de Hegel*
- S. Tortorella *Dietro le quinte dell'eticità: normatività e disposizione soggettiva nella Fenomenologia dello spirito*
- A. Süner *Bringing Back the Picture: A Revision of the Pictorial Understanding of Language in Light of Wittgenstein*
- J.M. Fritzman
M.D. Guerrero
E.S. Moorhead *Everything is Its Opposite: Bennett's Stalemates, Willard's Draws, Kant's Antinomies, and Hegel's Sublation*
- F. Chiereghin *I correlati neurali dell'intersoggettività. Nota su alcune scelte lessicali a proposito dei neuroni specchio*

VERIFICHE 2022

1-2

2022

ANNO LI N. 1-2

verifiche
rivista semestrale
di scienze umane

Verifiche. Associazione di Studi filosofici
Sede: via Francesco Algarotti 13/a – 35125 Padova
Direttore responsabile: Antonella Benanzato
Amministrazione: info@verificheonline.net
Autorizzazione Tribunale di Padova n. 2445 del 17/09/2017
Poste Italiane s.p.a. - Spedizione in Abb. Postale 70% - NE/PD
Digitalandcopy sas - Vignate (MI), Via Roma 25
Anno LI - N. 1-2 Gennaio-Dicembre 2022
www.verificheonline.net

PREZZO € 55,00

Verifiche

Rivista fondata da Franco Chiereghin e Giuliano Rigoni

Direzione/Editors

Luca Illetterati (Scientific Coordinator), Paolo Giuspoli (Editorial Coordinator), Francesca Menegoni.

Redazione/Editorial Staff

Michela Bordignon, Francesco Campana (Editorial Guidelines), Valentina Chizzola, Luca Corti (Peer review Editor), Alberto Gaiani, Paolo Livieri, Giovanna Luciano, Armando Manchisi, Giovanna Miolli (Web Manager), Elena Nardelli, Antonio Nunziante, Federico Orsini, Giovanni Realdi, Barbara Santini (Reviews and Discussions Editor), Sergio Soresi, Alberto Vanzo.

Consiglio scientifico/Advisory Board

Gabriel Amengual, Myriam Bienenstock, Rossella Bonito Oliva, Claudio Cesa (†), Franco Chiereghin, Ferruccio De Natale, Giannino Di Tommaso, Alfredo Ferrarin, Luca Fonnesu, Stephen Houlgate, Marco Ivaldo, Jean-François Kervégan, Claudio La Rocca, Eugenio Mazzarella, Adriaan Th. Peperzak, Michael Quante, Leonardo Samonà, Birgit Sandkaulen.

The Journal uses a double-blind peer review procedure. Authors of articles to be considered for publication should email one copy in .doc or .rtf format, and another copy in .pdf format, to Luca Corti (redazione@verificheonline.net). Please include a short abstract in English (about 1,500 characters) and 4-8 keywords. The Journal accepts contributions in English, German, Italian, French, Spanish and Portuguese. Accepted contributions should be prepared according to the journal's guidelines. Book reviews are generally commissioned by the Editorial Staff. If you are interested in writing a book review, please contact Barbara Santini (recensioni@verificheonline.net). Books should be sent to the following address: «Verifiche», c/o Luca Illetterati, Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sociologia, Pedagogia e Psicologia Applicata, Università degli Studi di Padova, Piazza Capitaniato 3 - 35139 Padova, Italy.

«Verifiche» is an international biannual, peer-reviewed Journal (ISSN: 0391-4186)

info@verificheonline.net

www.verificheonline.net

Verifiche

International biannual, peer-reviewed Journal (ISSN: 0391-4186)

ABBONAMENTO/SUBSCRIPTION PRICE

Italia: privati € 55,00 (sostenitori € 65,00; studenti € 35,00); enti: € 80,00.

Europe and Mediterranean Countries: € 75,00 (students: € 55,00); institutional: € 100,00.

Other Countries: € 90,00 (students: € 70,00); institutional: € 115,00.

Spese postali incluse/Shipping charges included.

FASCICOLI SINGOLI/SINGLE ISSUES

Italia privati: € 35,00 (fascicolo doppio: € 65,00); enti: € 45 (fascicolo doppio: € 85,00)

Europe and Mediterranean Countries: plus € 11 shipping charges (double i.: plus € 17).

Other Countries: plus € 16 shipping charges (double i.: plus € 22).

FASCICOLI ARRETRATI/BACK ISSUES

Italia: € 40,00; Europe and Mediterranean Countries: € 40,00 (plus € 11 shipping charges).

Other Countries € 40,00 (plus € 16 shipping charges).

MODALITÀ DI PAGAMENTO/METHOD OF PAYMENT

Con bonifico bancario intestato a/By bank transfer to:

«Verifiche. Associazione di studi filosofici»

Intesa Sanpaolo Spa - Filiale terzo settore Veneto centro, via Jappelli 13 - Padova

IBAN: IT54X0306909606100000142839

Nella causale specificare il numero o l'annata (per ordini) oppure solo l'abbonamento (in caso di abbonamento annuale). Please indicate *issue number* and *year* (for single issue) or *year* only (for yearly subscription).

Per usufruire dello sconto per studenti è necessario indicare nella casuale il numero di matricola e la sigla della sede universitaria (oppure l'indicazione dell'istituto).

For further details:

info@verificheonline.net

www.verificheonline.net

Cover Design by Giulia Battocchia

verifiche

Anno LI, N. 1-2, 2022

Dir. resp. Antonella Benanzato • Amministrazione: Via F. Algarotti 13/a - 35125 Padova
Autorizzazione del Tribunale di Padova n. 2445 del 17.09.2017
Digital And Copy S.a.s. - Vignate (MI) - Via Monzese 40 - A. LI (1-2), 2022

v *Editoriale / Editorial*

Padova Hegel Lectures

1 *Filosofia del diritto senza Scienza della logica? Un dibattito in corso sulla filosofia sociale di Hegel*

Miguel Giusti

19 *Hegel's Idea of Philosophy and the World at the End*

Angelica Nuzzo

37 *Motivos da estética de Kant na estética de Hegel*

Marco Aurélio Werle

Essays

61 *Dietro le quinte dell'eticità: normatività e disposizione soggettiva nella Fenomenologia dello spirito*

Sabina Tortorella

87 *Bringing Back the Picture: A Revision of the Pictorial Understanding of Language in Light of Wittgenstein*

Ahmet Süner

109 *Everything is Its Opposite: Bennett's Stalemates, Willard's Draws, Kant's Antinomies, and Hegel's Sublation*

J.M. Fritzman, Miguel D. Guerrero, and Emma S. Moorhead

133 *I correlati neurali dell'intersoggettività. Nota su alcune scelte lessicali a proposito dei neuroni specchio*

Franco Chiereghin

Discussions

163 *The Practical Beyond Ethics. Notes on George di Giovanni's Interpretation of Classical German Philosophy*

Paolo Livieri

179 *Evaluations are No Propositions: A Reply to Kantian Nonconceptualists Concerning the Critical Theory of Taste*

Mahyar Moradi

203 *Kant über das Erhabene und die Freiheit. Zum Gefühl der übersinnlichen Bestimmung des Gemüts*

Barbara Santini

229 *Der sich begreifende Begriff. Nota sui significati di concetto nella Scienza della logica di Hegel e la sua genesi*

Paolo Giuspoli

255 *Socialisation and Personification as Forms of Domination in Marx*

Pablo Pulgar Moya

- 277 *Un argomento fenomenologico contro l'esistenza del libero arbitrio*
Luca Zanetti
- 303 *Il dibattito sul realismo e le sue dicotomie: immagine manifesta vs immagine scientifica del mondo e ontologia vs epistemologia*
Andrea Velardi
- 323 *L'amore e oltre. Note a Il dio dalle frecce fiorite. Miti e leggende dell'amore in India, di Giuliano Boccali*
Franco Chiereghin

Book Symposium

On Angelica Nuzzo's *Approaching Hegel's Logic, Obliquely: Melville, Molière, Beckett*

Edited by Giovanna Luciano

- 337 *Introduction*
Luca Illetterati
- 343 *A Philosophy of Crisis: Immanence and Normativity in Hegel's Logic*
Giovanna Luciano
- 349 *Obliquity in Question: Method, Transformation, and Metaphilosophical Implications*
Giovanna Miolli
- 359 *Hegel's Discursive Logic: The Re-Enactment of Method*
Giulia Bernard

- 367 *Advancement, Stasis, Revolution: On Angelica Nuzzo's Approaching Hegel's Logic, Obliquely*
Giulia La Rocca
- 373 *On the Use of Literature in Philosophy. Considerations on Angelica Nuzzo's Approaching Hegel's Logic, Obliquely: Melville, Molière, Beckett*
Francesco Campana
- 379 *Approaching Hegel's Logic, Obliquely – Once Again*
Angelica Nuzzo

Book Reviews

- 387 I. Chiaravalli, *L'oggetto puro. Matematica e scienza in Descartes*
(Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero)
- 393 L.L. Pizzichemi, *L'uso di sé. Il concetto di 'uso' in Kant e la questione del fondamento della filosofia trascendentale*
(Mateja Lara Schmidt)
- 398 S. Møller, *Kant's Tribunal of Reason: Legal Metaphor and Normativity in the Critique of Pure Reason*
(Lara Scaglia)
- 403 Marina F. Bykova (a cura di), *The Bloomsbury Handbook of Fichte*
(Francesco Azzarone)
- 409 Karen Ng, *Hegel's Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic*
(Silvia Locatelli)
- 413 Andrea Staiti, *Etica naturalistica e fenomenologia*
(Rosario Croce)

APPROACHING HEGEL'S LOGIC, OBLIQUELY – ONCE AGAIN

by Angelica Nuzzo*

I cannot think of a better way for a (philosophy) book to be received than to produce new lines of thinking and to stimulate new paths of research – paths that do certainly take their departure in the book itself but may then take on new and unexpected lives of their own. Addressing the book's 'aftermath', as it were – *this* is the most rewarding experience for the author. So, here I am – thankful for having this unique opportunity to reflect on my own work and on the work of others, to address the new beginnings (or, perhaps, the advancements) which my book has produced and continues to produce.

I want to use the present occasion to push a step farther one of the questions embodied by the book as a whole. At stake is a general issue to which all the contributors to this discussion have more or less directly referred (thematically and particularly, Giovanna Miolli and Giovanna Luciano). And as I shall point out below, I consider it significant (and perhaps it is part of that very issue) that all the participants in this discussion have raised this question. It is not so much a question that regards specific aspects of my reading of Hegel's text, i.e., the text of the Logic and its reconstruction. It is, rather, the issue of what it means to *interpret* Hegel's Logic in the way I do, given that I take such interpretation as generating a sort of non-negotiable methodological imperative concerning the act of doing philosophy in our own time and in our own historical actuality – after Hegel but with his Logic and with his method. As Giovanna Miolli suggests, at stake herein is indeed a broader «meta-philosophical» question and connected to it is also a «meta-critical» point which concerns, quite generally, what it means to «interpret» a philosophical text.

* City University of New York

Interpretation, this is now my suggestion (and the framework within which I want to address the questions posed to me by the other contributors), is necessarily connected with the demand that our present time of multiple, dramatic crises puts on us philosophers, namely, the demand of doing philosophy in a peculiarly new way. Presently, harkening back to the title of my book, to my reconstruction of Hegel's Logic, and to the commentators' questions, I want to call this novel way of doing philosophy the «method of oblique immanence»¹. Thus, my present claim is that interpreting Hegel's Logic imposes on us the demand (the 'duty' I'd like to say, this time in a non-Hegelian but rather Kantian fashion) to do philosophy in a newly engaged way which is *immanent* in the world that we inhabit and yet is able to take on the crisis of this world *obliquely*, as it were, that is, quite generally, in such a way as to mobilize unconventional intellectual forces in order to de-stabilize and utterly redefine all our intellectual and practical categories and ultimately the very framework in which we do philosophy. While I will get to a more precise account of this method in what follows, I want to underline from the outset that it is indeed a «revolution» that is brought forth by this method, as Giulia La Rocca aptly suggests. Alternatively, my claim is that reading Hegel's Logic «immanently» and «obliquely» necessarily changes the way the interpreter understands and does philosophy in her own time. In this regard, as Francesco Campana and Giovanna Luciano rightly point out, the interpreter (that is, directly, myself) does indeed uphold a perspective that is 'Hegelian' as she does philosophy, approaches and uses literary texts, and confronts the reality of the/her present in the «Hegelian» way. This way, however, is not something that can be taken for granted at any point. And this is precisely the problematic issue which the book addresses in an uncontroversial way. To challenge and de-stabilize what counts as the alleged Hegelian response to the crisis is indeed one of the aims and outcomes of the book. It is, to be sure, one of the chief results of the oblique perspective that frames my reading of Hegel's Logic.

¹ Giovanna Miolli correctly characterizes the «oblique» perspective of my book as a «method». But all the contributors offer important insights on the «oblique» way I approach Hegel's text.

In the present remarks, then, I connect the «absolute method» of Hegel's Logic (which the book thoroughly analyzes and reconstructs) with the «method of oblique immanence» that I propose as the best suited method for doing philosophy today. The connection between the two is a strong one: the former (Hegel's «absolute method») leads to the latter (the «method of oblique immanence») *necessarily*². Furthermore, the connection (and the necessity) is a *dialectical* one. As much as such method may be resisted or rejected, our contemporary world makes the confrontation with it unavoidable. Responding to Giulia La Rocca's point, I shall say that even refusing to comply with the demand of the method (even «stasis» or, more generally, negative action as such) is a form of advancement: non-action is itself a position caught within the whole of actuality – a position for which we are responsible; a position that produces real consequences in the world³.

Taking up Giovanna Luciano's suggestion, I want to insist on and clarify the peculiar kind of «normativity» of what I take to be the demand that the method of oblique immanence puts on the contemporary interpreter-philosopher. Such normativity is a type of dialectical necessity – the same kind of dialectical necessity that Hegel carries out in the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit vis à vis* skepticism viewed both as a historical position and as a philosophical (but also common sense) attitude more broadly. The true – and the only possible – refutation of skepticism is «thoroughgoing skepticism» – *sich vollbringender Skeptizismus*, i.e., a skepticism that ultimately turns against itself once it is completed (*vollbracht*) in all its forms (i.e., in all the negations it may possibly perform) and once it is brought to its radical consequences. Accordingly, referring here to one of Giulia Bernard's points, as we have completed the task of «re-enacting» the method of the Logic in its second, this time synchronous reading, we should have

² This may be a first answer to Giovanna Luciano's question concerning the «normativity» of the idea of philosophizing at stake herein.

³ I argue for this in the analysis of figures of inaction or stuck action such as the fanaticism in *Tartuffe* (but also in the analysis of the crisis that paralyzes Socrates before going to battle).

become «more aware» than we were before. Given that, for Hegel, the method is the «consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content»⁴, the result of the method's re-enactment (on our part) is a deeper and clearer and more complex consciousness (of the logical content and its overall movement). Importantly, however, the higher awareness and consciousness that belongs to the absolute method is now passed on *to us* as it has been made into the internal character of *our own position*⁵. This means that *for us* the stakes have become necessarily higher. This means also that Hegel's absolute method requires that we live up to these higher stakes (in our own philosophical practice, in our endorsing, this time, the «method of oblique immanence»). And this is true whether or not we consent on fulfilling the demand of the method (again, even not-consenting involves us in the dynamic of the method, i.e., is a position within it, albeit a negative one). Thus, to Giulia Bernard's question concerning the «kind of action» that our «re-enactment» of the Logic properly is, I would answer that such an action is the ongoing fulfillment of the task incumbent on *our own philosophizing*. This is, indeed, the true «advancement» beyond Hegel's Logic.

From all this it follows – and I agree with Giovanna Luciano on this point – that there is an element of necessary and reflective «self-critique» that our rationality experiences in the moment in which it confronts the task of thinking through our own predicament with Hegel's Logic but also further on away from it. The crucial question that we should critically ask ourselves, then, is this: are we truly living up to the demands of the method, to the higher stakes imposed on us at this historical junction once we have fulfilled the (second) reading and re-enacting of Hegel's Logic? Understood in this way, «self-critique» is the opposite of the

⁴ GW 21, p. 37

⁵ This is why, to further answer Giulia Bernard, the Logic does *not* itself «discursively articulate» the «re-reading» of the Logic required by the method that I propose. In fact, this is *our* task. Contrary to what Bernard suggests, it is not «reticence» on Hegel's part. It is, though, certainly a «structural» feature of the method, namely, to empower us, directly, to do (again, anew) what the method does (and has done) throughout the Logic.

attitude of unreflective compliance with the *status quo*; it is the opposite of normalization; the opposite of accommodation. Again, I would place precisely at this point the 'revolutionary' moment implied by the method.

In my remarks so far I have hinted at or explicitly used several times the non-Hegelian language of Kant's moral philosophy in order to characterize the normativity of the «method of oblique immanence» resulting from Hegel's own «absolute method» and its re-enactment. I have alluded to our responsibility as thinkers, and even to an «imperative» or «duty» imposed on us by the method and the higher consciousness achieved by it. I have done this on purpose. While there is, to be sure, no moral-ethical undertone in the dialectical necessity that comes from the method of Hegel's Logic – the necessity for us, today, to be engaged in our own present according to the method of oblique immanence – I do believe that the additional language of Kant's moral imperative and obligation (and also the autonomy build into it) may indeed strengthen the urgency of our philosophical response to the crisis that our present imposes on us. It may very well be that each and every historical epoch has perceived its own peculiar problems in terms of the 'worse' crisis that humanity has ever encountered. Humans have indeed always been prone to apocalyptic imaginations. Each crisis is, as such, the worse. Each crisis signals the «end» – except that the world and history go on, on to the next crisis⁶. And yet, it is undeniable that our historical predicament puts us squarely in one of the worse crises in which not only humanity, but the entire eco-system of the earth is mired, sliding perhaps or rather collapsing to a point of no return. And since the philosophical method that we need to mobilize in order to tackle such an extreme crisis is constitutively bound to the historical dimension (as Giulia La Rocca rightly sees at the beginning of her remarks), it may very well be that we need to conjure up all the intellectual resources we can in order to address the crisis of our present. To this aim, Hegel

⁶ I appreciate the point that Giovanna Luciano raises in the conclusion of her remarks looking back to my introduction of the book: the relevance of Hegel's philosophy lies in the «necessity to start again each time with a new comprehension of the crisis of the world». The task is always new and never over.

should join forces with Kant. Higher awareness comes with a higher moral and ethical obligation. This is the reinforced normativity proper of the philosophical method. The «advancement» out of the Logic to and within our own present (and then away from it) should be, this time, charged with an evaluative component (to Giulia La Rocca's point regarding the nature of the advancement). We cannot afford sliding backwards; we cannot afford stalling for too long. The logical character of philosophy's method is here one with its ethical dimension. In this regard, I see the fruitfulness of the method of oblique immanence in its capacity to join dialectical logic with an ongoing ethical commitment. At issue, quite simply, is not only the inexorable *need* to comprehend the world we live in and our action in it (quite in the sense of Hegel's *Bedürfnis der Philosophie*). At stake is the *obligation* we have for engaging in such a task – an obligation that comes from philosophy itself.

The crisis of the present requires from us *as philosophers* to be engaged in our world (this, I repeat, characterizes the unavoidable position of immanence) in such a way as to open up new imaginative possibilities (the point well made both by Giovanna Mioli and by Giulia Bernard). Now, to do so in the «oblique» perspective means different things. First, the obliquity of the philosopher's standpoint is necessary in order to destabilize both the intellectual tools at our disposal (the traditional set of categories, technical language, strategies of analysis and argumentation, and so on) and the practical strategies to cope with the present. In this regard, I take destabilization to be a stronger action than critique. But obliquity also allows us to challenge from within the life forms and practices in which our categories are embedded and by which they are materially shaped.

Herein, I place my answer to Francesco Campana's interesting problematization of the relationship between philosophy and literature (and art more generally). I do see thinking and rationality and imagination as fulfilling the same task as they are working toward the same cognitive and practical objective. They must work together, though, in solidarity within the same complex structure of actuality, in solidarity within the same crisis. This is achieved precisely by philosophy's oblique perspective. For, second, the method's obliquity shatters disciplinary divisions by opening up

philosophical thinking to trajectories that traverse and conjoin disciplinary fields, intellectual techniques and languages. But third, obliquity also mobilizes resources that speak not only to the power of rationality but also to emotions, feelings, and passions. As much as art and literature do fulfill an irreplaceable cognitive function (assenting here to Francesco Campana's point), philosophy should be able, on its part, to speak to the passions and the emotions. As strange as this may sound, it is, I believe, a genuine Hegelian point. As Hegel puts it, the «language of the concept» must connect with (and translate into) the «language of representation» and *vice versa*, thereby bringing to life the movement of a *Herüber- und Hinübergabe* between the two that, eventually, is integrated in the circle of the science.

But fourth, the obliquity of the philosophical method in its historical immanence also shatters the clear-cut division (and compartmentalization) that separates theory and practice (as I intimated above in proposing to connect the logical and the ethical significance of the method). Philosophy should not be a merely theoretical (let alone academic) discipline. Its task is not only the (conceptual) comprehension of its own time. As Giovanna Luciano aptly puts it, philosophy must find and fulfill (yet again) its «practical vocation». After all, this time with Giulia Bernard, the method of Hegel's Logic has put us «in the position of *doing*» things. Hence we *must* do them. The method is indeed a way of doing, of practically and responsibly living in and engaging this world.

To all this I want to add a fifth characterization of the obliquity of the method, one that conjoins, perhaps, all the features listed above. The oblique way is the alternative way to get to the center – to the center of things, to the *Sache selbst*, to use Hegel's poignant expression. It may very well not be the shortest or the easiest or the most obvious way, not the usually threaded path, not the common sense one. Obliquity is a trajectory that does not take things (even the most obvious) for granted. It is a way of discovery. It means allowing ourselves to be surprised – surprised by the new connections, the new truths, the new horizons that this perspective discloses. This is the way that is faithful to what Hegel calls the

Arbeit des Begriffs – to which I shall add the work of feeling and representation. Such is indeed the work of philosophy.

I want to conclude these considerations with a last point concerning the historical crisis of our present time. Our minds easily go to the host of epochal problems we are confronted with – most of them problems of our own human making. To be sure, they are the reason of the urgency of the crisis addressed above. But there may be another crisis less momentous and of which we are less explicitly aware – more a *Bekanntes* than an *Erkanntes* to use Hegel's famous characterization. And this is the crisis of philosophy itself. Such a crisis may in fact be a good thing. In a positive sense, I detect this crisis in the remarks of all the contributors to this discussion. It is manifest as a latent desire searching for new paths, for new realms of inquiry, for new ways of channeling the energy of thinking⁷. All this I welcome, dialectically, as a sign of strength of philosophy itself. Philosophy understands the need to renew itself. This is what I gather from our present discussion. And I want to conclude, then, with the hope of seeing many more instances of oblique thinking coming out of my book and taking new individual paths of their own⁸.

⁷ Giovanna Miolli explicitly ends her remarks with references to the difficult relation between Hegel and feminist thinking, as well as with references to those she considers other possible representatives of the oblique method (Julieta Kirkwood). Francesco Campana seems interested in new explorations of art and literature.

⁸ I want to thank Giovanna Luciano for having organized this book symposium and having followed this project through from the beginning to the end.